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Claire R. Rollor* 
Logic, Not Evidence, Supports a Change in Expert 
Testimony Standards: Why Evidentiary Standards 
Promulgated by the Supreme Court for Scientific 
Expert Testimony are Inappropriate and Inefficient 
When Applied in Patent Infringement Suits 
“If you are wondering what the Supreme Court is doing with all of these patent cas-
es, it seems to me that the Court is telling the Federal Circuit that patent cases are 
no different from any other.” —Gretchen S. Sween1 
I. Introduction 
Recently, technology and innovation have been recognized as possible ave-
nues to halt the recent decline of the American economy.2 President Obama has an-
nounced that “[t]he first step in winning the future is encouraging American inno-
© 2013 Claire R. Rollor 
 *   J.D. Candidate May 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.S., Electrical 
Engineering, Tufts University School of Engineering. Executive Symposium Editor, Journal of Business & Tech-
nology Law. 
 1.  Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Patent 
Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 205 (2009) (quoting the Honorable Lee Yeakel from the 
June 2008 meeting of the Austin Intellectual Property Law Association where he suggested that the Supreme 
Court is attempting to promote equitable application of legal standards to patent law); see also Timothy B. Lee, 
Specialist Patent Courts Are Part Of the Problem, FORBES, Aug. 19, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
timothylee/2011/08/19/specialist-patent-courts-are-part-of-the-problem/ (arguing that the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit consistently provides too much protection for patents by creating unique precedent in pa-
tent infringement adjudications). But see Patent Medicine: Why America’s Patent System Needs to Be Reformed, 
and How To Do It, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21526370?fsrc= 
scn/tw/te/ar/patentmedicine (suggesting that patent law adjudications should be handled by specialized courts 
as opposed to non-expert juries). 
 2.  See The Decline and Fall of the American Empire, CBSNEWS, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
2100-215_162-7121029.html?pageNum=2 (revealing a decline in American innovation in terms of both num-
ber of patent applications filed and number of American students who obtain university degrees); see also Louis 
Uchitelle, When Factories Vanish, So Can Innovators, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/02/13/business/13every.html? (“The big debate today is whether we can continue to be competitive in 
R&D when we are not making the stuff that we innovate . . . I think not; the two can’t be separated.” ). 
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vation”3 and that patent reform will create more jobs.4 To adapt the United States 
Code and provide significant patent reform in order to meet these ends, Senator 
Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to the Senate on January 25, 2011.5 On September 
16, 2011, President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,6 which is 
the most significant change to the patent statutes since the Patent Act of 1952.7 
Despite express legislative and executive support for the development of con-
sistent and efficient best practices in patent law,8 the federal judiciary has instead 
ignored festering issues that have inundated certain aspects of patent law, in partic-
ular the current standards governing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony 
in patent cases.9 In patent cases, these evidentiary standards play an extremely im-
portant role because almost all suits involve scientific expert testimony and the tes-
timony provided frames both legal and factual arguments.10 
In the midst of procedural evidentiary uncertainty,11 both the necessity of height-
ened evidentiary requirements for efficient application of patent rules12 and strong 
 3.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/01/26/2011-state-union-adress-enhanced-version? 
category=9).  
 4.  During the recent State of the Union, President Obama stated that “growing industries in science and 
technology have twice as many openings as we have workers who can do the job . . . openings at a time when 
millions of Americans are looking for work.” President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 
2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-
union-address); see also President Barack Obama, Presentation to Congress Regarding the American Jobs Act 
(Sept. 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/09/08/ 
president-obama-presents-american-jobs-act-enhanced-version#transcript). But See David Goldman, Will Pa-
tent Reform Really Create 200,000 Jobs?, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/08/technology/ 
patent_reform_jobs/index.htm (finding that the job-creation statistical support promoted by Senator Leahy was 
“extremely limited in scope” and did not definitively provide evidence that patent reform would create more 
jobs). 
 5.  S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011). The Senate accepted the House version of the bill. See H.R. 1249, 112th 
Cong. (as passed by the Senate, Sept. 8, 2011). 
 6.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 257). 
 7.  Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952); see also James C. Danaher, America Invents 
Act Brings Sweeping Change to the Patent Laws and Rules - Part 1: Patent Office Changes, JD SUPRA (Sept. 26, 
2011) (“This Act made significant changes to the patent law and rules.”).  
 8.  See, e.g., Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical Analysis, and Rec-
ommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 153 (2011) (stating that removal of the best mode requirement by the 
America Invents Act would reduce litigation costs focused on the subjective evaluation of that requirement for 
the invention). 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3 (1999) (stat-
ing that testimony from experts is “virtually essential” in patent law cases); see also Arianna Frankl, The Im-
portance of Experts in Patent Litigation, IP LAW OUTLOOK (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.iplawoutlook.com/2012/ 
01/25/the-importance-of-experts-in-patent-litigation/ (reviewing a recent case in which a party to a patent suit 
did not rebut persuasive expert testimony and thereby lost its opportunity to later supply additional testimony 
on appeal). 
 11.  See infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra Part V. 
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congressional intent regarding consistent patent decisions13 have required federal 
district courts to create their own standards regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony.14 In doing so, the federal district courts have inconsistently interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s evidentiary standard elucidated in Daubert for scientific expert 
testimony,15 and as a result, there are substantive variations in similar cases, address-
ing these procedural issues, across circuits.16 Instead of continuing to apply incon-
gruent solutions, federal district courts should: 1) adopt the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Koito Standard as the proper measure for the ad-
missibility of scientific expert testimony in patent cases and 2) allow admissibility of 
scientific expert testimony to be determined by judges on a sua sponte basis. 
To provide adequate background, Part II of this Comment outlines the typical 
elements of the patent infringement process, including common defenses and the 
role of expert testimony.17 Part III discusses the policy behind the creation of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and the de-
gree of authority the Federal Circuit exercises over cases involving patent related 
subject matter.18 Part IV reviews the various disparate standards created and used by 
the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and regional circuit courts to determine the 
admissibility of expert testimony in patent infringement cases.19 Part V discusses 
problems faced by federal district courts attempting to resolve the disparate stand-
ards for admitting scientific expert testimony and also provides parallel areas of 
laws in which the Supreme Court’s solution has yielded inadequate results.20 Finally, 
Part VI provides long-term and short-term solutions to the problem at hand.21 
Adopting the suggested solutions will reduce confusion in federal district courts re-
garding the appropriate evidentiary standard, increase consistency in patent law 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  Federal district courts have had to determine the admissibility of scientific expert testimony in patent 
cases in accordance with confusing and unpredictable binding authority. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 16.  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 
1197 (2002) (stating that judges may give into the temptation to assume that an expert is automatically a person 
having ordinary skill in the art and worthy of trust). Law is comprised of both substantive and procedural com-
ponents. See Differing Protections of Procedural and Substantive Due Process, 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional 
Law § 953 (2012) (discussing due process as comprising “dual aspect[s]”: procedure and substance); see also 
John Dvorske et al., What Law Governs, 1A C.J.S. Actions § 41 (“Law is substantive if it creates, defines, and reg-
ulates the rights and duties of the parties and may give rise to a cause for action, whereas procedural law per-
tains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is deter-
mined or made effective.”) However, some procedural changes can have substantive effects. See, e.g., Martin H. 
Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statuto-
ry Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 93 (2008) (finding a substantive effect to Rule 38, which predominantly 
was directed to governing procedural matters in federal appellate courts). 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  See infra Part III.  
 19.  See infra Part IV. 
 20.  See infra Part V. 
 21.  See infra Part VI. 
Logic, Not Evidence, Supports a Change 
316 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
outcomes and encourage enforcement of patent rights, and provide patent in-
fringement cases with an evidentiary standard high enough to promote efficient 
substantive outcomes. 
II. Patent Infringement: Validity and Its Interplay  
with Expert Testimony 
Patent law has developed into a specialized and complex branch of intellectual 
property.22 To obtain a patent, a party must apply in writing to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and engage in a series of written transactions and 
conversations, which has been dubbed “patent prosecution.”23 Only after a patent is 
granted may a party engage in patent litigation and sue parties infringing on patent 
rights.24 To comprehend when an expert’s scientific testimony would be necessary 
in patent infringement suits and how the expert’s testimony could then affect the 
case, it is important to have a foundational understanding of both the typical patent 
process, including invalidity hearings,25 and the special role that experts providing 
scientific testimony hold in the patent infringement arena.26 
A. The Patent Process and a Typical Patent Infringement Suit 
A patent is the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or sell-
ing [an] invention throughout the United States or importing [an] invention into 
the United States.”27 To be eligible for patent rights, an inventor must first file an 
application that discloses the invention with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO).28 A patent examiner employed by the PTO reviews the disclo-
sure to certify that it has met several criteria. Namely: 1) the invention is properly 
 22.  See Janine Robben, Patently Obvious, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19, 21 (2009) (stating that intellectual proper-
ty is often practiced by boutique firms or specialized departments in larger firms, wherein patent practice is 
performed by parties with special technical degrees). 
 23.  See Blaine Larson, How Tangential Does It Have to Be Making Sense of Festo’s Tangential Limitations, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 959, 963 (2011) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (9th ed. 2009)) (discussing the ex parte 
interactions with the United States Patent and Trademark Office that make up patent prosecution); see also 
Amin S. Khan, Is it Patentable? An Overview of Patentability and Loss of Rights, DCBA Brief 8, 12 (2005) (defin-
ing patent prosecution is the procurement stage during which time there are “patentability tests, supported by 
an examiner’s search on relevant prior art, office actions, and applicant’s responses, deletion and/or amend-
ments to claims, telephone and personal interviews, petitions and appeals, and other such events”). 
 24.  See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–38 (2004) (finding that liti-
gation involving patents tends to occur when the disputed patent is in the early phase of its patent term). 
 25.  See infra Part II.A. 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
 27.  35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a) (West 2012). 
 28.  35 U.S.C.A. § 111(a)(1) (West 2012). The patent prosecution process only begins with the filing of the 
application. It is also common for patent prosecution to include an assignment phase, in which inventors assign 
their rights to another party. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2012). 
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claimed and disclosed,29 2) the invention is of a patentable subject matter and use-
ful,30 3) the invention is novel,31 4) the invention is not obvious,32 and 5) the inven-
tion is not subject to any statutory bars.33 If a disclosure does not meet these criteria 
then the applicant has several options to continue prosecution until either the pa-
tent is issued or the application is abandoned.34 Once the PTO issues a patent, the 
patent is presumed to be valid35 for a term of 20 years.36 
When a patent holder believes that another party is infringing upon his patent 
rights, he has a cause of action that may be exercised by filing civil suit in federal 
 29.  35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012). A patent must meet four requirements under this heading. First, the 
claims must enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention without undue 
experimentation. Id.; see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reviewing eight factors that could 
be considered in evaluation of undue experimentation). Second, the patent must contain a sufficient written 
description of the invention, meaning that a person of ordinary skill in the art must be convinced that the in-
ventor has accomplished what is claimed and also fully understand the invention. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 
2012). Third, the disclosure must mention the best mode to practice the claimed invention. Id. This particular 
element, however, has become less significant since the passage of the America Invents Act, which strikes all 
repercussions for failing to disclose a best mode. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257). Fourth, the patent must be sufficiently definite, meaning 
that the patent must have clear and distinct claims. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012). 
 30.  35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012). Eligible subject matter includes “process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id. Subject matter explicitly disallowed by 
the judiciary includes laws of nature, abstract ideas, and physical phenomena. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980). The invention must also be useful, which generally means that it is operable and has sub-
stantial utility. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2012); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing that 
substantial utility exists in a patent when there is some “immediate benefit to the public”) (internal citations 
omitted); In re Swartz, 50 Fed. Appx. 422, 423–25 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding that cold fusion dis-
closed in an invention was not sufficiently operable). 
 31.  35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2012).  
 32.  35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2012).  
 33.  35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2012). An application must be filed in a timely manner as measured from 
the date of invention. Disclosures of information regarding the invention will preclude a patent from issuing if 
the information was released to the public or published more than a year prior to the date of application in the 
U.S. However, under specific circumstances an experimental use may not bar issuance. City of Elizabeth v. 
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (holding that experimental uses will not prompt a statutory bar if the 
invention cannot be experimented upon satisfactorily except for in public).  
 34.  An applicant may, upon a final rejection: “1) appeal the decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (the ‘BPAI’), an administrative body within the USPTO; 2) file a continuation application; 3) file a 
continuation-in-part (C-I-P) application; 4) request continued examination (RCE); or 5) abandon the applica-
tion.” See NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 42 (2d ed. 2011). The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is now 
renamed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the ‘PTAB’) pursuant to changes from the America Invents Act. 
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 6(a) 
(West 2012). The PTAB performs largely the same functions as the BPAI. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 6(b) (West 2012). 
 35.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012). A party challenging the validity of a patent must prove invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating 
that clear and convincing evidence is an “intermediate standard” which lies between “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” and “preponderance of the evidence” standards). 
 36.  35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 2012) (providing that the term for a patent begins on the issuance date 
and ends 20 years after the filing date). 
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district court.37 The court first reviews and interprets the claims of the patent 
through a procedural mechanism that can vary district by district, one of which is 
known as a Markman Hearing.38 In all circumstances, the judge has the final say in 
the interpretation of the patent’s claims.39 After completion of the claim construc-
tion, the court begins its infringement review and the alleged infringer is provided 
with an opportunity to present defenses.40 
Often defendants in infringement suits allege that the patent under question is 
invalid.41 By asserting invalidity, a defendant avoids an infringement investigation 
and instead stops the suit in a preliminary phase.42 The benefits to avoiding an in-
fringement investigation include lower transactional costs,43 lower attorney fees,44 
and freedom to continue previously investigated behavior without payment of roy-
 37.  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2012). Alternatively, a potential infringer may prompt action by filing for 
declaratory judgment alleging patent invalidity and non-infringement. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006); see, e.g., Cat 
Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 878–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (suggesting that declaratory judgment 
exists to “prevent avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain of his rights and threatened 
with damage by delayed adjudication” (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted))). 
 38.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379–80 (1996). Markman hearings, a nec-
essary part of any patent case with complicated claim language, allow both parties to testify as to their under-
standing of the claim language in the patent at hand. Federal district courts have discretion as to “whether, 
when, and how to conduct” these proceedings. See Doris Johnson Hines & Esther H. Lim, Markman Practice: 
Past and Present, 714 PLI, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 581, 583 (2002).  
 39.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 379–83. 
 40.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012). The statute specifically provides that: 
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent 
and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforcea-
bility, (2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II of this ti-
tle as a condition for patentability [including §§101–103 and 112], (3) Invalidity of the patent or 
any claim in suit for failure to comply with any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title, 
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title. 
Id. 
 41.  See, e.g., Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., No. 11-733-LPS, 2012 WL 4565013, at *2 (D. 
Del. Oct. 1, 2012) (reviewing the affirmative defense that several patent claims are invalid); Hoffman-LaRoche 
Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-4417 (SRC) (MAS) 2012 WL 4661588, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2012) (investigating an 
invalidity defense based on obviousness). 
 42.  See, e.g., Nellie A. Fisher, The Licensee’s Choice: Mechanics of Success Fully Challenging a Patent Under 
License, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (finding that licensees often assert invalidity “as a defense to a suit 
filed by the patentee for patent infringement”); Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 329 (1984) (categorizing invalidity as an asserted affirma-
tive defense). 
 43.  See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 
342 (concluding that an invalid patent is often considered “an effective threat” because “defense of an infringe-
ment suit . . . is expensive”). 
 44.  See id. (discussing the favorable nature of settlement as opposed to litigation after a party has an-
nounced its intention to begin invalidity hearings).  
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alties.45 To render a patent invalid, a defendant (or the party seeking declaratory 
judgment) may assert that the patent was anticipated or obvious at the time it was 
filed.46 To show that the patent under question was anticipated by a particular refer-
ence, the testimony must: 
1) Be provided by one skilled in the art, 
2) Identify each claim element, 
3) State the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and 
4) Explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in a single prior 
art reference.47 
Anticipation is a question of fact.48 If the patent infringement suit is presented be-
fore a jury in federal district courts, anticipation is a matter for the jury to decide.49 
If the decision is appealed, the Federal Circuit reviews anticipation and questions of 
fact for clear error.50 
To show that a set of references had obviated the patent, testimony must meet 
elements one through three above and also: 
4) Explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in a particular 
set of references, and 
5) Provide a motivation for one skilled in the art to combine that partic-
ular set of references in order to practice the claimed method.51 
 45.  See David A. Toy, Implied Non-Infringement and Ownership Warranties in Intellectual Property Agree, 
41 COLO. LAW. 61, 61 (2012). 
 46.  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012). Invalidity may also be asserted on grounds that mirror the provi-
sions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 U.S.C. § 103. See B.D. Daniel, Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litiga-
tion: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 378 (2008); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Un-
enforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 109 (2006) (discussing two categories of invalidity suits: “First, it 
may argue that the patent is invalid as a traditional defense . . . Second, that patent infringement defendant may 
assert an antitrust counterclaim based on the patentee’s enforcement of a fraudulently procured (or known 
invalid) patent”). All invalidity discussed within the Comment is within the scope of Leslie’s first category of 
invalidity. 
 47.  Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 48.  In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo 
Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 49.  Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 50.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 51.  See generally Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). A determination of obviousness is a matter of 
law, for the judge to decide. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416–17 (2007). After hearing testimo-
ny, the four factors reviewed for an inquiry of obviousness by the judge are: 1) the level of ordinary skill in the 
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The Supreme Court has determined that obviousness is a question of law.52 Howev-
er, not all federal district courts treat it as such, and as a result, obviousness is occa-
sionally presented as a matter for the jury to decide.53 Upon appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, the standard of review for obviousness and questions of law is de novo.54 
A judge may use anticipation or obviousness testimony to find the patent under 
question to be invalid.55 If the patent under suit is invalidated, the plaintiff no long-
er has a claim and the case is dismissed — the defendant will have presented a de-
fense sufficient enough to allow the alleged infringer to legally continue his behav-
ior.56 However, patents are presumed to be valid, given that there is a presumption 
of agency correctness, and the standard of proof for invalidity is stringent.57 To 
overcome a valid patent and successfully meet the standard, a challenging party 
must provide a significant amount of evidence that the patent is invalid.58 The re-
cent controversial landmark decision, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,59 clari-
fied that invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and not by a 
preponderance of the evidence.60 The presumption of validity stands regardless of 
whether or not the set of prior art reviewed by the PTO was complete.61 To meet the 
clear and convincing evidentiary standard, many litigants provide expert testimony, 
and scientific expert testimony can be crucial in proving invalidity.62 
 
 
art, 2) the scope and content of the prior art, 3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, 
and 4) any secondary considerations. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 52.  See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418. 
 53.  See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1353, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (instructing a jury to determine the factual underpinnings of a patent’s nonobviousness, a question of 
law, but reviewing alternative methods employed in some district courts wherein a jury’s factual findings would 
have been used for an obviousness determination). 
 54.  See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 55.  See Daniel, supra note 46. 
 56.  See Michelle L. Evans, Establishing the Defense of Patent Invalidity, AM. JUR. 3D POF, §§ 8–9 (2012). 
 57.  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i, Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (explicitly stating that the 
standard for invalidity is clear and convincing evidence from codification of the common law in the Patent Act 
of 1952); 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2012) (providing invalidity as a defense that may counter an infringement 
suit); see also Sue Ann Mota, The Times They Are a’ Changin’: Bilski v. Kappos, Global Tech v. SEB, Standford v. 
Roche, and Microsoft v. i4i, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 257, 269–71 (2011). 
 58.  See Evans, supra note 56, at § 15. 
 59.  131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 60.  Id. at 2246. 
 61.  See Irina Oberman, Maintaining the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Patent Invalidity Chal-
lenges in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 
440–41 (2012) (suggesting that patents without adequate prior art review in the PTO have benefited from the 
clear and convincing evidence standard, and that these patent holders can now stymie legitimate innovation 
with their “bad patents”). 
 62.  See Patent Validity and Infringement Litigation, 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 909 (2012) (providing that 
expert testimony is typically provided in questions of patent validity).  
Claire R. Rollor 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 321 
B. Expert Testimony in Patent Cases 
In patent proceedings, members of the appropriate scientific community are select-
ed and verified as meeting a minimum scientific expert testimony standard.63 If they 
meet this standard, they bear the title of a “person having ordinary skill in the art” 
(PHOSITA). Only PHOSITAs may explain the contested technology before the 
court.64 The PHOSITA role is filled by an expert who has the normal skills and 
knowledge in a specific technology for a particular set of patent proceedings.65 
When a patent examiner first reviews a patent, many of the essential criteria for is-
suance require the patent examiner to consider a hypothetical PHOSITA’s perspec-
tive.66 If the patent is later brought before the court in an infringement proceeding, 
the judge may hear testimony on claim construction from a technical expert, given 
that the expert may provide a PHOSITA’s perspective.67 After all disputed claims 
have been reviewed in claim construction proceedings, if the parties do not settle or 
request summary judgment,68 some defendants proceed to have their technical ex-
perts argue that the allegedly infringed patent was invalid at the time of filing, usu-
ally by the anticipation and obviousness constructions discussed above.69 
Patent infringement proceedings that involve juries provide additional opportu-
nities for technical experts to advance their corresponding party’s agenda.70 Juries 
are not used in Markman hearings,71 but it is possible there will be a jury presence 
 63.  See James Buchwalter et al., 69 C.J.S. Patents § 77 (2012) (discussing the viewpoint of a person of ordi-
nary skill in the invention, which must meet at least the court determined “level of ordinary skill in the art”). 
But see Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
227, 229–38 (2009) (reviewing the PHOSITA standard and the singling out the “level of ordinary skill” as a 
largely untouched and vague area of law). 
 64.  See Darrow, supra note 63, at 236. 
 65.  See generally Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (likening a 
PHOSITA to “the reasonable man” found in other branches of the law). 
 66.  A patent examiner uses the PHOSITA standard to assist in determinations of novelty and obviousness. 
35 U.S.C.A. §§102(a), 103(a) (West 2012).  
 67.  See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (allowing one party’s expert to speculate about a PHOSITA’s characterization); cf. Sundance, Inc. v. 
DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (disallowing a patent attorney to testify to 
technical issues given that he was not also a qualified technical expert and therefore unable to provide a 
PHOSITA’s perspective). 
 68.  But see Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 220 (2011) 
(stating that settlement, or litigation in efforts to achieve settlement, are the most popular routes taken in patent 
infringement suits). 
 69.  See supra Part II.A. 
 70.  See generally Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent Infringement 
Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 484, 485–88 (2009) (reviewing an average juror’s susceptibility in 
patent cases to factors other than evidence and law, including punishment, net returns for the patentee, and 
other personal reasons).  
 71.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (pronouncing that the “construc-
tion of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court”). 
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post claim construction for infringement proceedings.72 Interestingly enough, de-
spite the Supreme Court’s explicit determination that obviousness is a matter of law 
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,73 it is still common practice for federal dis-
trict courts to employ jury trials for most hearings on validity, including those relat-
ed to obviousness.74 Many active patent attorneys disagree with such judicial prac-
tices and have expressed concern that juries are not the appropriate party to deter-
determine whether or not a patent is valid.75 Given the common concern that juries 
“decide randomly” and are composed of “mostly people of only average education 
and intelligence,”76 there is ample opportunity for a likable technical expert to sway 
the decision-maker with or without sufficient evidence to support his testimony.77 
Although experts play an important role in patent infringement cases, their role is 
actually subordinate to that of the presiding court, given that the court system can 
choose how to apply evidentiary standards that have the potential to impose limita-
tions on the expert’s testimony. 
III. The Role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is often considered the ultimate au-
thority on patent law matters.78 As the authority on almost all substantive patent law 
and on some procedural patent law, it is important to understand both the policy 
behind the creation of the Federal Circuit79 and the extent to which the Federal Cir-
 72.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n [s]uits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” Id.  
 73.  550 U.S. 398, 416–17 (2007). 
 74.  See William A. Demory, Patent Claim Obviousness in Jury Trials: Where’s the Analysis?, 6 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 449, 458–60 (2011) (providing a comprehensive review of various district courts that employ juries to 
yield “a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on whether a patent claim is obvious” without addressing all of the Graham factors); 
see also Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc, 688 F.3d 1342, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (premising further 
discussion on the provision that obviousness is a “mixed question of law and fact”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu, Improving Patent Jury Trials, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 89, 90 (1996) 
(stating that experienced “practitioners often cannot predict jury outcomes”); Devon Curtis Beane, Whose Right 
Is It Anyway: The Evisceration of an Infringer’s Seventh Amendment Right in Patent Litigation, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1853, 1853 (2011) (suggesting modern legal scholarship finds that patent law is “far too complex” for jury tri-
als); Allan N. Littman, The Jury’s Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman, Hilton Davis and 
Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997) (expressing the sentiment that jury trials may be “less predictable” and “less 
susceptible to review for consistency”). 
 76.  See Michel & Rhyu, supra note 75, at 90. 
 77.  See generally Steve E. Perkel, If They Don’t Like You They Won’t Hear You: An Essay on Persuasive 
Communication, THE JURY EXPERT, May 1, 2010, available at http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2010/05/if-they-
dont-like-you-they-wont-hear-you-an-essay-on-persuasive-communication/. 
 78.  See, e.g., James B. Kobak, Jr., Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Hidden Choices Between Origi-
nal and Sequential Innovation, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 39 (1998) (claiming that the Federal Circuit is the “ultimate 
authority for most [patent] misuse issues.”); John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor 
General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 536–37 (2010) (suggesting that Supreme Court review relies almost entirely 
on splits within the Federal Circuit when it sits en banc, therefore providing a great deal of decision-making 
power to the Federal Circuit even in cases of review). 
 79.  See infra Part III.A. 
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cuit really has the final word in patent law related matters.80 Clarification of the un-
derlying purpose of the Federal Circuit and its role in the promulgation of eviden-
tiary standards for patent law allows for a cogent perspective as to why the disparate 
standards throughout the federal court system for the admissibility of scientific ex-
pert testimony are undermining the core values of patent law. 
A. The Policy Behind the Creation of the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit was created to solve a variety of nationwide legal issues, many 
of which are patent law specific.81 Before the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent 
law litigants invested a great deal of time in selecting a favorable forum because fo-
rum shopping was the norm.82 At that time, certain courts provided an expansionist 
approach to patents and therefore provided stronger patent protection, while others 
acted with a strict textualist approach and were not favored by patent holders.83 Fo-
rum shopping issues were also in part caused by the lack of national uniformity in 
patent law jurisprudence, which led to unfair and varied doctrinal developments 
across circuit courts.84 
The Federal Circuit has been predominately hailed as a success by legal schol-
ars.85 Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, which is a conglomeration of 
two older courts: the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.86 The addition of the Federal Circuit as the newest federal court has gained 
attention as “perhaps the single most significant institutional innovation in the field 
of intellectual property in the last quarter-century.”87 It is also commonly thought 
that the Federal Circuit has unified many disparate patent laws across the country 
and increased consistency in patent law rulings.88 
 80.  See infra Part III.B. 
 81.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). The Federal Circuit also has appellate review over the following courts’ 
decisions: the Court of International Trade, International Trade Commission, Merit Systems Protection Board, 
Court of Veterans Appeals, Court of Federal Claims, and United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. 
 82.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981). 
 83.  See id. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 75 (2010) (reviewing the Su-
preme Court’s hands off approach within the Federal Circuit created patent law jurisprudence). But see Jeanne 
C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1446–47 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has not 
shown enough deference to federal district courts and has promoted too much judicial activism). 
 86.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 87.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 7 (2003). 
 88.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1989) (surveying the Federal Circuit case law and finding that its rules are “consistent with the under-
lying philosophy of patent law” and that they are “easy” for the lower courts and the research community to 
apply); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11 (2004) (highlighting the successful trajectory of the Federal Circuit’s 
progress). 
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B. The Authority of the Federal Circuit in Patent Cases 
The Federal Circuit is the appellate court for all patent infringement cases. The Fed-
eral Circuit differs from the other federal appellate courts in that its jurisdiction is 
over cases involving specific subject matter as opposed to cases originating within 
certain geographical areas.89 The Federal Circuit is presided over by twelve judges, 
and an odd-numbered panel consisting of at least three judges hears its cases.90 Any 
patent case that reaches the Federal Circuit has either passed through litigation in a 
U.S. district court or prosecution appeals within the PTO administrative system.91 
After the Federal Circuit decides a case, the decision is presumed to be valid unless 
it is modified, vacated, reviewed, set aside, or remanded by the Supreme Court.92 
Review by the Supreme Court is always by certiorari.93 
The Federal Circuit’s procedural law jurisprudence is complicated by its choice 
of law standards. When a case is captured by a subject matter that removes it to fed-
eral district courts and thereafter the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit panel has 
authority to decide the entire case, not strictly issues related to patent law.94 Alt-
hough all federal appellate courts are required to adhere to uniform rules of proce-
dure,95 there are some significant differences between the procedural standards for a 
certain regional circuit court and the Federal Circuit.96 To provide guidance to liti-
gants on the law that will be applied in these circumstances, the Federal Circuit has 
stated that it will defer to regional circuit law for procedural questions that are not 
sufficiently “unique” or “related” to patent law or a question that does not “bear [] 
an essential relationship to” patent law.97 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has devel-
 89.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1338(a) (2006). Section 1338(a) provides federal district courts with original juris-
diction over patent cases. 28 U.S.C. §1338(a) (2006). Section 1295 grants the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdic-
tion over many different suits from different courts. 28 U.S.C.A. §1295 (2006). Pursuant to section 1295(a)(1), 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the U.S. district courts relating 
to patents. 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 90.  28 U.S.C. § 46 (2006); FED. R. APP. PROC. 47(a)(1) (allowing appellate courts to create and distribute 
their own local rules for governance); FED. CIR. R. 47(a)(2). For information regarding the allocation of judges 
per individual circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
 91.  Litigation that has been appealed from a district court accesses the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1295. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). For suits that were initiated in the PTO, Federal Circuit appellate 
jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2006); 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West 2012). 
 92.  28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006). 
 93.  28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). There is no longer appeal available under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1978) (re-
pealed 1988). 
 94.  See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters in 
Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 648 (2009) (addressing the Panduit standard that initially articulated 
a choice of laws context for the federal circuit for issues that were not related to patent law but that yet were to 
be determined by the Federal Circuit). 
 95.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.; FED. R. EVID.  
 96.  See generally Field, supra note 94. 
 97.  Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75, 1575 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam).  
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oped procedural law that intermingles regional circuit rules with its own precedent, 
and the choice of law doctrine can be fairly unpredictable.98 
IV. Standards for Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony in 
Patent Cases 
The Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and several other regional circuit courts 
have each created unique standards that govern when scientific expert testimony is 
admissible.99 The Supreme Court has analyzed the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
developed the Daubert Standard to govern the admissibility of scientific testimony, 
which is discussed in Section A below.100 The Daubert Standard sets a fairly low bar 
for the admission of scientific testimony. The Federal Circuit has approached the 
admissibility of scientific testimony with considerations specific to patent law and 
developed the Koito Standard, which is discussed below in Section B.101 The Koito 
Standard imposes significant restrictions on the admission of scientific expert tes-
timony as it relates to patent law. Regional circuit courts have also adopted varying 
standards for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, which are occasionally 
used by the Federal Circuit pursuant to its procedural choice of law doctrine, and 
one example is discussed below in Section C.102 The regional circuit court standards 
vary significantly.103 Federal district courts handling patent infringement cases are 
faced with several complex challenges: they must follow Supreme Court precedent 
on the matter, they must determine whether the evidentiary standard to be applied 
should be addressed in the same manner as the Federal Circuit or as their regional 
circuit court, and they must apply the evidentiary standard without deviating from 
the Supreme Court precedent. 
A. Evidentiary Standard One: Daubert and the Supreme Court 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court drastically altered 
and clarified the law regarding the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.104 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, several lower courts had adopted a test of 
their own: scientific expert testimony was admissible if the theory on which it was 
based had “gained general acceptance in [its] particular field.”105 This older test be-
 98.  See Sean M. McEldowney, The Essential Relationship Spectrum: A Framework for Addressing Choice of 
Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1652–53 (2005) (expressing concern that the 
procedural law for patent cases is unpredictable as a result of the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent application of its 
choice of law rules). 
 99.  See infra Part IV.A–IV.C. 
 100.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 101.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 102.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 103.  See infra Part V.C. 
 104.  509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 105.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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came known as the Frye Standard.106 The Frye Standard was extremely administrable 
given that the presiding judge did not need to understand the theories supporting 
the scientific testimony at hand; he only needed to determine whether the scientific 
community had accepted the supporting theories as valid.107 However, when the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975, courts were provided with new 
standards for admission of scientific expert testimony that largely discarded the Frye 
Standard.108 
Given these new rules, the Supreme Court used Daubert as an opportunity to 
provide trial judges with a directive: to take a more active role in determining the 
admissibility of scientific expert testimony. The Court held that Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 702109 requires judges to review the reliability of the methods supporting sci-
entific expert testimony and the qualifications of the expert.110 To assist the district 
courts in their reliability inquiries, the Court issued several factors that must be 
considered:111 
1) Whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested,112 
2) Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication,113 
3) Whether there is a known or potential rate of error involved in a par-
ticular scientific technique,114 
4) Whether there exists or are maintained standards controlling the 
technique’s operation, and115 
5) Whether there is “general acceptance” of the theory or technique.116 
 106.  See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 
1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 107.  See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 
41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386–87 (2001) (presenting significant evidence that the Frye Standard is alive and still in 
use throughout many jurisdictions). 
 108.  Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926 
(1975). Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly retain the Frye Standard, the Daubert factors in 
part require the trial judge to still consider whether there is “general acceptance” of the theory — the essence of 
the Frye Standard. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  
 109.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 110.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993). 
 111.  See id. at 593–94. In some literature and judicial opinions, factors 3 and 4 are combined and represent-
ed as a single factor. 
 112.  Id. at 593. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 594. 
 115.  Id. 
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The Daubert factors may, at minimum, be summarized as charging the courts with 
addressing testability, peer review, likelihood of error, controlling standards, and 
general acceptance in their review of the applicable scientific expert testimony.117 
Courts have interpreted the Daubert factors to provide a comprehensive yet low bar 
for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.118 
No other rule among the Federal Rules of Evidence raises the bar for the admis-
sion of scientific expert testimony.119 In fact, the language of Rule 705 further em-
phasizes the low admissibility bar promoted by the Daubert Standard.120 Rule 705 
prescribes that an expert may “testify in terms of opinion or inference” even if the 
expert does so “without first testifying to the underlying facts or data.”121 The Su-
preme Court has continued to apply the Daubert Standard in more recent decisions, 
and it is still valid law.122 
B. Evidentiary Standard Two: Koito and the Federal Circuit 
Although the Federal Circuit has stated that extrinsic expert testimony is secondary 
in nature to the intrinsic nature of a patent application itself,123 many Markman 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 593–94. The four Daubert factors must be reviewed, but courts are encouraged to look to any 
other relevant factors in determining the reliability of the scientific testimony. Id. at 594. All evidence reviewed 
must be relevant pursuant to Rule 402. FED. R. EVID. 402. “Relevant” is defined to be any evidence that has “any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.  
 118.  See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 
2162 (2003) (finding that there is some support in Daubert for “liberalizing” the standard for admissibility); see 
also Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Stand-
ards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478 (2005) (considering that some courts continue to effectively adhere to the Frye 
Standard while claiming that they are performing the Daubert review). But see Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Sil-
verman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 217, 242 (2006) (countering that some courts have been overemphasizing the “flexible” approach lan-
guage, which detracts from the Supreme Court’s intent to limit evidence to only reliable evidence). 
 119.  The only other applicable standard for scientific expert testimony may be found in Rule 104(a). FED. 
R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 104(a) merely requires the trial judge to determine “whether the expert is proposing to 
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 120.  FED. R. EVID. 705. 
 121.  Id. “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first 
testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be re-
quired to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 122.  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 151 (1997) (applying the relevance plus reliability 
standard from Daubert); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (expanding the Daubert 
Standard to all types of expert testimony, not just “scientific” expert testimony, which was later codified in an 
amendment to Rule 702); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (citing Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 
at 156–57). 
 123.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that expert testimony may 
be helpful in patent cases in the following ways: “to provide background on the technology at issue, to explain 
how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is con-
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Hearings and patent infringement suits frequently introduce some form of scientific 
expert testimony.124 Scientific expert testimony is regularly introduced in patent 
suits according to the particular district’s local rules,125 and then the sufficiency and 
relevancy of the testimony must be determined. 
In Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,126 the Federal Circuit held that the 
unsupported opinion of even the most qualified expert is simply not “substantial 
evidence” adequate to support a jury verdict.127 In district court, Koito Manufactur-
ing had initially filed a complaint for declaratory judgment of non-infringement 
due to the invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 5,045,268 (the “‘268 patent”) and succeeded 
in pleading its case of anticipation before a jury.128 On appeal, patentee Turn-Key-
Tech attacked the scientific testimony of Koito’s expert witness, Dr. Kazmer, as 
conclusory and insufficient to prove patent invalidity.129 Dr. Kazmer was brought to 
the stand to testify that the ‘268 patent was anticipated by Japanese Unexamined 
Application No. 148,082 (JP ‘082).130 Dr. Kazmer’s sole testimony on the matter was 
limited to a few conclusory lines: he stated that ‘268 was anticipated by five different 
prior art patents that included JP ‘082.131 Needless to say, the Federal Circuit was 
unimpressed with the Defense’s attempt to invalidate the ‘268 patent.132 The court 
explained that Dr. Kazmer’s testimony was general and conclusory because he did 
not set forth evidence that discussed how the mentioned references anticipated the 
particular patent at hand.133 
The Federal Circuit went even further than the particular facts of the case and 
announced in Koito that its decision is not merely limited to issues of anticipation 
sistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art 
has a particular meaning in the pertinent field”). 
 124.  See generally Molly Treadway Johnson et al., Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials: A Preliminary 
Analysis, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 1 (2000) (ranking patent cases as one of the top three types of civil cases frequently 
requiring expert testimony). 
 125.  See, e.g., E.D. TEX. P.R. 4-2(b) (2012) (providing the Eastern District of Texas’ local patent rule regard-
ing the admissibility of expert testimony and the associated procedural requirements). 
 126.  Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 127.  See id. at 1152. 
 128.  See id. at 1144–45. 
 129.  See id. at 1151–52. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1152. Testimony provided by Dr. Kazmer was provided as follows: 
All these prior art patents provide for products and ways of making products with thick and thin 
sections. The gate locations are shown, and they all have inherently crossing flows in sections of 
the product, sometimes substantial sections of these products, such that they all would have a 
cross-laminated section as Turn-Key is applying that term to the accused lenses. 
Id. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Id.; see also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305–08 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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in patent cases.134 The court specifically stated that it requires “substantial evidence” 
for jury verdicts involving issues of anticipation, obviousness, and the doctrine of 
equivalents.135 
C. Evidentiary Standard Three: Choice of Law Doctrine and the Federal Circuit Court 
Although the Federal Circuit has favored its Koito Standard, the court has applied, 
particularly in recent times, the Koito Standard sporadically.136 Instead of providing 
a consistent evidentiary standard, the Federal Circuit has revealed that it is willing 
to apply its aforementioned procedural choice of law doctrine in situations regard-
ing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.137 In Uniloc v. Microsoft,138 the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court had “improperly rejected” an expert’s 
testimony as “incomplete, oversimplified and frankly inappropriate.”139 In reaching 
these conclusions, the Federal Circuit expressly stated that it had applied the First 
Circuit’s evidentiary standard to determine the admissibility of scientific expert tes-
timony.140 The First Circuit had adopted a special relevance version of Daubert as its 
evidentiary standard,141 so the Federal Circuit reviewed the scientific expert testimo-
ny for admissibility pursuant to the First Circuit’s altered Daubert Standard.142 
Overall, pursuant to the choice of law doctrine, the Federal Circuit may apply the 
regional circuit court’s evidentiary standard for the admissibility of scientific expert 
testimony, wherein the regional circuit court jurisprudence to be applied is deter-
mined by the initial location of the suit in federal district court.143 
 134.  See Koito Mfg. Co., 381 F.3d at 1152–53. 
 135.  See id. at 1152 & n.4. The Federal Circuit has continued to apply the expert testimony standard from 
Koito to its current docket. See, e.g., AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (applying the Koito Standard to defenses involving the doctrine of equivalents); Innogenetics, N.V. v. 
Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (further extending the Koito Standard to determining 
validity matters of obviousness).  
 136.  See, e.g., i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the pro-
cedural law of the Fifth Circuit for admission of evidence relating to anticipation); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (using the procedural law of the First Circuit for determin-
ing the admission of evidence relating to claim construction). 
 137.  See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc., 632 F.3d at 1305–06 (applying regional circuit law, which governed the ad-
missibility of expert testimony); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that JMOL was a procedural issue, and therefore applied the Fourth Circuit’s law, which approved 
denial of invalidity on the grounds that scientific expert testimony was conclusory). 
 138.  Uniloc USA, Inc., 632 F.3d at 1292.  
 139.  Id. at 1305 (internal citations omitted). 
 140.  Id. at 1305–06. 
 141.  See Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994) (directing courts in the First Circuit 
confronted with a motion for judgment as a matter of law to “not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of evidence”). 
 142.  Uniloc USA, Inc., 632 F.3d at 1305–06. 
 143.  See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 418 F.3d 1282, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The grant or denial of a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not unique to patent law, reviewed under the law 
of the regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie.” (quoting Summit Tech., 
Inc. v. Nidek Co., 363 F.3d 1219, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
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V. The Need for Intervention 
There are too many standards that govern scientific expert testimony evidentiary 
jurisprudence, and the Federal Circuit has not provided guidance as to when a spe-
cific set of evidentiary standards must be followed for patent law cases.144 Such un-
certainty prevents patent cases in federal district courts from maintaining con-
sistency across rulings regarding the admissibility decisions.145 Unsurprisingly, 
regional circuit courts have already adopted laws that in many circumstances disre-
gard the Daubert Standard and instead complicate federal district court patent law 
jurisprudence pursuant to the choice of law doctrine.146 Even beyond the regional 
circuit court jurisprudence, other branches of law have recognized the need to de-
part from the Daubert Standard and create more particularized standards.147 The 
need for intervention in patent law jurisprudence is exemplified further by these 
instances of self-preservation: other regional circuit courts are willing to definitively 
depart from the Daubert Standard for scientific expert testimony and other complex 
areas of law have been quick to implement unique evidentiary standards to suit 
their specific purposes. 
A. Patent Validity Is Uncertain in Federal District Courts with the Current Expert Tes-
timony Admission Standards 
1. Anticipation 
Several federal district courts, provided with merely conclusory scientific expert tes-
timony, have expressed concern about sufficiently following all binding legal prece-
dent when asked to resolve issues of patent invalidity relating to anticipation. In the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the court was provided 
with scientific expert testimony that “did not provide any basis for [the] conclu-
sion,” and as a result the court first reviewed both the Daubert and the Koito Stand-
ards.148 The court found that the expert had skipped “the second required step of 
comparing claim elements to the prior art” by making “naked conclusions of antic-
ipation.”149 Some courts, like the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, have decided to follow the Koito Standard and now require that tes-
timony disclose particular aspects of the prior art of all the relevant patent’s 
claims.150 The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin has 
 144.  See infra Part V.A. 
 145.  See infra Part V.B. 
 146.  See infra Part V.C. 
 147.  See infra Part V.D. 
 148.  Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd. v. Mergen Ltd., 345 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434–35 (D. Del. 2004). 
 149.  Id. at 435. 
 150.  Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–95 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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also followed suit in General Electric Co. v. SonoSite, Inc.,151 and more or less disre-
garded the Daubert Standard by holding that even a conclusory “claim by claim 
analysis” is no more than conclusory testimony as to the existence of a particular 
claim element.152 
2. Obviousness 
The federal district courts have also faced confusion in attempts to resolve issues of 
patent invalidity pertaining to obviousness when experts submit only conclusory 
scientific testimony. In some jurisdictions, courts are faced to cope with testimony 
similar to that provided in NewRiver, Inc. v. NewKirk Prods. Inc.,153 wherein the fol-
lowing exchange occurred between Dr. Szymanski, an expert witness for NewKirk, 
and opposing counsel: 
Q: Do you have an opinion as to the validity of that claim? 
[Dr. Szymanski]: Yes, I do. 
Q: And what is your opinion? 
[Dr. Szymanski]: My opinion [is] that it would be obvious for the per-
son of ordinary skill in the art, this invention would be obvious to the 
person of ordinary skill in the art [sic].”154 
The NewRiver court then reviewed the different evidentiary standards promoted 
by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court and reviewed the major discrepancy 
between these standards for how to deal with conclusory testimony in obviousness 
proceedings.155 The court found that Daubert disallows lower district courts to “en-
graft additional hurdles on the admissibility of evidence beyond those found in the 
Rules themselves,” while that is “exactly what [the] Federal Circuit jurisprudence 
does.”156 Judge Young then found himself in the tough position of having to follow 
both evidentiary standards.157 
 151.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. SonoSite, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 793 (W.D. Wis. 2009). 
 152.  Id. at 812–13 (citing CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “general and conclusory testimony” cannot suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity)). 
 153.  NewRiver, Inc. v. NewKirk Prods., Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 154.  Id. at 331. Under the Daubert Standard, the court was required to accept Dr. Syzmanski’s conclusory 
statements without further explanation for reaching such a conclusion. Id. 
 155.  Id. at 333–34. 
 156.  Id. at 333. 
 157.  Id. at 334. Since the time of NewRiver, Inc. v. NewKirk Prods., Inc., Justice Young has attempted to 
resolve his understanding of the disparate standards for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. Ambit 
Corp v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 141 (1999)) (declaring that he would no longer rule sua sponte on the adequacy of testimony and in-
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Judge Young is not alone; there are many other federal district court judges fac-
ing similar issues with conclusory scientific expert testimony in settling matters of 
obviousness. In Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co.,158 the court had difficulty reach-
ing a decision on the invalidity of a patent because of dueling experts.159 In another 
situation, a court was left uncertain of what to do with twelve paragraphs of “con-
cluding summaries” provided by an expert witness, and for which, the witness con-
ceded he provided no analytical basis.160 
B. Resolutions Vary Across the Federal District Courts 
As a predictable result of the two disparate standards from courts with binding au-
thority, federal district courts with patent dockets have not managed the admissibil-
ity of conclusory scientific expert testimony in a consistent manner. Some district 
courts, realizing that the gap between the Daubert Standard and the Koito Standard 
has created confusion among litigants, remand and order new trials on issues relat-
ed to invalidity.161 Alternatively, another court has insisted that two experts dueling 
over the invalidity of a patent be subjected to cross-examination so that the court 
could reach a legal conclusion of obviousness.162 Some courts have provided a more 
harsh perspective and excluded conclusory scientific expert testimony in its entire-
ty,163 while others have allowed but disregarded the evidence.164 
C. Regional Circuit Courts Have Already Begun to Disregard the Daubert Standard, 
and these Daubert Variations Have Become Part of the Patent Law Evidentiary Juris-
prudence 
Many regional federal circuit courts have not remained faithful to the binding relia-
bility review of expert testimony required by the Daubert Standard.165 As an unfor-
stead now rationalizes the Koito Standard as part of the relevancy requirement of Rule 402, and therefore a part 
of the Daubert Standard). 
 158.  Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 159.  Id. at 478. 
 160.  Sprint Communications Co. LP v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 05-2433-JWL, 2007 WL 2572417 at *2 
(D. Kan. Sept. 4, 2007). 
 161.  NewRiver, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 162.  Alloc, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 478. By requiring the two experts submit to cross-examination, the court 
inherently limited the admissibility of expert testimony that was required to reach the legal conclusion of obvi-
ousness. Id. 
 163.  See, e.g., Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd. v. Mergen Ltd., 345 F. Supp. 2d 431, 435–37 (D. Del 2004) (refusing 
to admit into evidence conclusory statements made by a technical expert). 
 164.  See, e.g., Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–98 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm. Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted)); 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. SonoSite, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 793, 812–13 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (citing CytoLogix Corp. v. Ven-
tana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (stating that “general and conclusory testimony. . . 
does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
 165.  See generally Ruth Saunders, The Circuit Courts’ Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 46 DRAKE L. REV. 407 (1997). 
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tunate side effect of the Federal Circuit’s procedural choice of law doctrine for pa-
tent law cases, these variations of the Daubert Standard have also joined the original 
Daubert and Koito Standards in the patent law evidentiary standard jurisprudence. 
These new standards complicate matters further for patent law litigants depending 
on the geographic region where a suit may be brought. 
Each of the circuits has taken a different approach to the Daubert Standard.166 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has often reviewed the 
admissibility of expert testimony per the broad relevancy requirement found in 
Rule 401167 and not addressed the Daubert factors.168 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit has on occasion reviewed only whether or not there is “a 
logical relationship between the evidence proffered and the material issue that the 
evidence is supposed to support.”169 Other circuit courts, such as the First Circuit 
and Third Circuit have tweaked the Daubert reliability standard and created their 
own versions respectively referred to as a “special relevance requirement”170 and the 
“higher than bare relevance”171 standards. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit has created a standard that weighs whether 1) the expert has con-
sidered and ruled out other alternative explanations and 2) whether the expert drew 
sufficient connections between given testimony with the facts of the case.172 Moreo-
ver, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have sometimes introduced the temporal context 
of when the testimony was provided as a factor to determine the admissibility of ev-
idence.173 However, some circuits, like the Fifth and Eleventh, seem to apply the 
 166.  See generally id. (reviewing in turn each of the individual regional circuit standards for the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony). 
 167.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 168.  See, e.g., Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265–66 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Comm., 239 F.3d 179,184–85 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
 169.  See, e.g., Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the admissibility 
of the testimony by merely determining whether or not the information was pertinent to the determination at 
hand and without requiring the experts to validate theories). 
 170.  See, e.g., Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998). Testimony is 
admissible if it is relevant, “not only in the sense that all evidence must be relevant, but also in the incremental 
sense that the expert’s proposed opinion, if admitted, likely would assist the trier of fact to understand or de-
termine a fact in issue.” Id. 
 171.  See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (allowing generalizations 
related to liver cancer to apply to the case despite specific examples that were explicitly outside of the generaliza-
tion); Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that bare relevance is “not intended to 
be a high [standard]”); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152–53 (3d Cir. 1999) (maintaining that the 
expert’s conclusions need only “reliably follow” the facts used by the expert). Third Circuit doctrine admits 
testimony but distinguishes between testimony that is admissible and testimony that is significant by relying on 
the judge’s belief as to whether the conclusions made by the expert are the correct conclusions. The doctrine 
adopted by the Third Circuit also incorporates all of the Standards promoted by Daubert. See also Saunders, 
supra note 165, at 417. 
 172.  See Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 687–88 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 173.  See, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (adding to what the court 
titles the “non-exclusive” list of Daubert factors the question of whether the expert’s opinion had been devel-
oped “expressly for the purposes” of providing testimony before the court); Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 
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original Daubert Standard more consistently.174 It is readily apparent that many re-
gional Circuit Courts have used Daubert as more of a set of general guidelines that 
can be supplemented by rules particular to the circuit.175 
D. Courts Have Found the Daubert Standard Insufficient When Applied to Other  
Legal Issues 
Several other legal avenues aside from patent law have found the Daubert Standard 
insufficient for their particular evidentiary needs. Some scholars have found the 
Daubert Standard insufficient for criminal trials.176 These scholars state that it is 
common for scientific experts presenting testimony to overstate the accuracy and 
validity of forensic results, and that in front of a jury, there is particular vulnerabil-
ity to miscarriages of justice.177 By allowing this “inaccurate but persuasive evi-
dence,” judges had satisfied the Supreme Court’s mandate in Daubert but abdicated 
a responsibility to justice.178 However, scholars have begun to address issues with the 
Daubert Standard; they argue that it is 1) hard for attorneys to rebut conclusory fo-
rensic evidence, 2) likely that juries will place unfounded emphasis on forensic evi-
dence, and 3) proven that there is inconsistent application of the Daubert Standard 
across varying jurisdictions.179 
The insufficiency of the Daubert Standard is also evident in litigation regarding 
climate change.180 Due to the prong of the Daubert Standard that measures the test-
ability of theories before considering them sufficiently reliable to measure up to 
Rule 702, climate research infrequently reaches the stand in the form of admissible 
expert testimony.181 Climate change evidence is particularly susceptible in that alt-
hough it is generally accepted as being valid and “widely peer reviewed and pub-
lished,” there is no way to test a model.182 
243 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2001) (considering whether or not an expert’s study was “conducted” for “purposes 
of litigation”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying the heightened 
Rule 702 reliability requirement); Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311, 1317–19); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (applying the heightened Rule 702 reliability requirement beyond the Rule 401 relevance require-
ment). 
 175.  See generally Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 118, at 2144. 
 176.  See generally Munia Jabbar, Overcoming Daubert’s Shortcomings in Criminal Trials: Making the Error 
Rate the Primary Factor in Daubert’s Validity Inquiry, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2034 (2010). 
 177.  See id. at 2035. 
 178.  See id.  
 179.  See id. at 2036. 
 180.  See generally Brooks E. Harlow & Roy W. Spencer, An Inconvenient Burden of Proof? CO2 Nuisance 
Plaintiffs Will Face Challenges in Meeting the Daubert Standard, 32 ENERGY L.J. 459 (2011). 
 181.  See id. at 485–86. 
 182.  See id. 
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Additionally, Daubert has left scholars in the environmental-tort litigation realm 
searching for alternative evidentiary standards.183 Due to the fact that environmen-
tal-tort litigation depends on model-driven evidence, which is often too overly 
technical to be understood by a typical juror, the general Daubert Standard applies 
an inadequate threshold.184 These branches of law that struggle with the insufficien-
cy of the Daubert Standard’s evidentiary requirements are but a sample of many 
other specialty branches that need a more specific and administrable approach to 
govern the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.185 
VI. The Proposed Solution 
A solution to the aforementioned evidentiary problem must be able to satisfy a col-
lection or a subset of specific objectives. The following interests have particular sig-
nificance in determining an appropriate evidentiary standard for the admission of 
scientific expert testimony in patent law: 
x Encourage consistent rules regarding admissibility across all federal 
districts186 
x Create special heightened standards for patent cases187 
x Eliminate juror or judicial bias188 
x Decrease confusion regarding the standard for admitting expert testi-
mony189 
x Defer to the guidance of the Federal Circuit for developing an admis-
sibility standard190 
 183.  See generally Matthew W. Swinehart, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility 
of Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281 (2008). 
 184.  Id. at 1299–1300. 
 185.  See, e.g., Michael B. Kent Jr., Daubert, Doctors and Differential Diagnosis: Treating Medical Causation 
Testimony as Evidence, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 525, 530–32 (1999) (arguing that there are at least three different ways 
that differential diagnosis have been treated as scientific evidence); Neal C. Stout & Peter A. Valberg, Bayes’ 
Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 785 
(2005) (finding that courts have never sufficiently addressed the reliability of causation testimony in a toxic tort 
case by ignoring evidence of “1) the intrinsic accuracy of the tests used by the experts to reach their opinions. . . 
and 2) the extrinsic rate of the agent-induced disease among those with the disease”). 
 186.  See supra Part V.B. 
 187.  See supra Part I. 
 188.  See supra Part II.B. 
 189.  See supra Part V.A. 
 190.  See supra Part III. 
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x Tailor a standard to resolve the disparate standards for admission of 
expert testimony advanced by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court191 
There are sizable incentives for courts, individual litigants, and the U.S. economy 
to have both the courts and Congress make changes that will resolve the evidentiary 
issues discussed in Part V. For courts, the average patent case is considered signifi-
cantly more difficult and time consuming than the typical civil case.192 Individual 
litigants in patent cases face high stakes: the typical damage award in a patent case is 
around $10.7 million for jury trials and $700,000 for panel trials.193 Additionally, in 
times of a faltering economy it is important to remember that among the United 
States’ strongest exports are our technological innovations.194 By addressing the 
aforementioned objectives, patent cases can be decided expeditiously, a greater 
number of litigants will spend less money, and a strong U.S. patent system will be 
seen as an asset among many faltering aspects of the U.S. government.195 
A. Long Term Solution: Adopt the Koito Standard for Use in All Patent Infringement 
Cases 
The Federal Circuit’s Koito Standard is the most appropriate method for maintain-
ing a proper heightened standard for admissibility of scientific expert testimony ne-
cessitated by patent law. The major complication with the proposed solution is that 
the Koito Standard in its current form is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s 
Daubert mandate.196 Koito bars a great deal of conclusory testimony that would oth-
erwise be allowed by Daubert,197 but if patent law decisions were based merely on 
 191.  See supra Part IV. 
 192.  See, e.g., JOEL MOKYR, LEVER OF RICHES 248–49 (1990) (claiming historical evidences proves that “liti-
gation over patent infringement could sap the creativity of great technical minds, and ruin inventors financial-
ly”). 
 193.  CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, 2010 Patent Litigation Study: The Continued 
Evolution of Patent Damages Law, 11 (2010). 
 194.  See CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & LUKE REIDENBACH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC 
EXPORT PROMOTION 3 (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/ 
2011/02/pdf/high_tech_trade.pdf (reciting that the U.S. is still the “largest exporter of high-technology manu-
factured goods among major industrialized economies”); Andrea L. Johnson, Transborder Licensing: A New 
Frontier for Job Creation, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 103, 104 (2010) (citing that the U.S. exports high 
demand goods including “biotech, bio-fuels, and information technology”); Lucas Osborn, Globalization, Intel-
lectual Property, and Prosperity, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 517, 521 (2012) (stating that the United States is a “leading 
innovation exporter”). 
 195.  See generally Matthew B. Lowrie, Critical Issues in Managing Patent Litigation, 44 IDEA 267, 268 (2004) 
(“One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . has referred to the patent system as the 
‘backbone’ of our country’s economic system.”). 
 196.  See supra Part IV. 
 197.  See supra Part V.A. 
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conclusory testimony then the foundations of various patent criteria would be at 
risk from unsavory scientific experts willing to sell their conclusory opinions. 
However, in continued implementation of the Koito Standard, the Federal Cir-
cuit will not be breaking new ground. The Federal Circuit will not be the first Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to permanently modify the Daubert mandate.198 Patent law 
also has the advantage of not being the first specialized legal category to take issue 
with Daubert’s low standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony; ad-
vocates for several other legal subject areas have already begun voicing Daubert’s 
evidentiary inadequacies.199 
However, in maintaining solely the Koito Standard, patent law, legal codes, and 
the judiciary must submit to several drastic changes. First of all, Congress needs to 
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide specialized exceptions for scientific 
expert testimony in patent law proceedings.200 Second, the judiciary must be willing 
to mandate that the Koito Standard, without exception, is now the law for all deci-
sions regarding the admissibility of scientific expert testimony in patent cases.201 
Third, the Federal Circuit needs to clarify that it will not defer to other regional cir-
cuit court law by the procedural choice of law doctrine as it pertains to scientific 
expert testimony in patent law decisions.202 By clarifying the role of the judiciary in 
limiting scientific expert testimony for patent cases, the judiciary will provide neces-
sary support to supplement Congress’s and the President’s patent related initia-
tives.203 
1. Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Congress or the Supreme Court must amend the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules) 
to create an exception for the patent law scientific expert testimony jurisprudence.204 
Specifically, I propose amending the Rules to avoid patent law scientific expert tes-
timony being subjected to Rule 705 and limited by Rule 702. Rule 705 in its current 
form allows opinions and inferences without underlying support “unless the court 
requires otherwise.”205 The addition of a new rule would provide: “All scientific ex-
 198.  See supra Part V.C. 
 199.  See supra Part V.D. 
 200.  See infra Part VI.A.1. 
 201.  See infra Part VI.A.2. 
 202.  See infra Part VI.A.3. 
 203.  See supra Part I; see also Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations 
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1244–49 (2012) (discussing both the expanding role of the PTO be-
fore and in light of the America Invents Act and also the ways that the executive and legislative branches have 
increasingly challenged the judiciary in its interpretation of patent law). 
 204.  See generally United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933; Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006); see also James C. Duff, 
The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx. 
 205.  FED. R. EVID. 705. 
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pert testimony necessary for patent-related subject matter must meet: 1) at least the 
reliability standards of Rule 702 and also 2) any evidentiary standards promulgated 
for patent law by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Such a rule should 
never be bound to the standards promoted in Rule 705. 
Prompting Congress or the federal judiciary to propose and pass an amendment 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence would not be a simple task.206 The Rules operate to 
provide consistent evidentiary proceedings throughout the courts of the United 
States, the United States bankruptcy judges, and the United States magistrate judg-
es.207 As all patent cases are held in federal courts, patent cases are always subject to 
the Rules.208 To amend the Rules, there are two options.209 The first option would 
require Congress to enact legislation amending the Rule.210 Alternatively, Congress 
has authorized the federal judiciary to promulgate changes to the Rules, which are 
thereafter subject to review by Congress.211 The processes to change the Rules are 
extremely unpredictable and time-consuming.212 
2. Implementation by Judicial Mandate 
To successfully adopt the Koito Standard in patent related cases involving scientific 
expert testimony, the federal judiciary must mandate that the lower federal district 
courts adhere to its precedent and stop reexamining the issue. This may be done on 
either the Federal Circuit level or the Supreme Court level. The Federal Circuit may 
mandate lower federal district courts to meet the Koito Standard, but it has hesitat-
ed to make such mandates in the past unless there has been severe frustration of the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.213 The increase of forum shopping as a 
result of differing evidentiary standards may indeed provide the requisite frustra-
 206.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) 
(discussing the federal judiciary’s proclivity to work through judicial review as opposed to through its preemp-
tive lawmaking power). 
 207.  See FED. R. EVID. 101. 
 208.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006). 
 209.  See Merrill, supra note 206. 
 210.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  
 211.  See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). The federal judiciary forms a special commit-
tee, the Judicial Conference, to discuss and propose changes to the code generally. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
By May 1 of the year the proposed Rule is to become effective, the judiciary is charged with submitting the pro-
posed Rule to Congress for review. See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). 
 212.  See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—
The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and 
Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 859 (1992) (posing the theory that the 
“relative inactivity” in successful amendments to the Federal Rules is directly related to the inefficiencies of the 
rulemaking process). 
 213.  See, e.g., C.P.C. v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit does not have “supervisory authority” over district courts); In re Intern. Med. Prosthetics Research As-
socs., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that the Federal Circuit is “devoid” of supervisory au-
thority over district courts). But see In re Snap-on Tools Corp., 720 F.2d 654, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (providing 
supervisory authority when to do otherwise would frustrate the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit). 
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tion of appellate purpose. If the Federal Circuit is unwilling or unable to mandate 
lower federal courts to adhere to the Koito precedent, the Supreme Court should 
revisit the issue. 
3. Clarification of the Procedural Choice of Law Doctrine for Scientific Expert 
Testimony 
The adoption of the Koito Standard must be absolute if it is to be successful. One of 
the objectives of adopting the Koito Standard is to increase consistency and predict-
ability in patent decisions throughout various districts.214 If litigants are uncertain as 
to whether Daubert, Koito, or a regional circuit court variation of Daubert will gov-
ern the admissibility of expert testimony, then no progress will have been made. 
The Federal Circuit needs to clarify the scope of the procedural choice of law doc-
trine,215 particularly in light of its recent tendencies to use the choice of law doctrine 
as opposed to its own Koito Standard in cases such as Uniloc.216 
B. Short Term Solution: Admissibility Decisions Should Be Ordered by Judges Sua 
Sponte 
Given that the previous long-term goals are unlikely to be met in the immediate fu-
ture, there are some actions that courts can take to limit scientific expert testimony 
on an immediate basis. Overall, the most important and accessible objective is to 
prevent juror and judicial bias.217 Given the complex technical issues that are inher-
ently linked to patent law, jurors and judges alike often find themselves confused, 
particularly when there are two partisan experts providing conflicting testimony.218 
To solve this issue, judges should: 1) hear or require the submission of testimony 
with all relevant underlying support prior to experts presenting before a jury,219 and 
2) take greater advantage of opportunities to hear court-appointed expert witness-
es.220 In addition, those in charge of making judicial appointments should more of-
 214.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that “in the 
area of patents, it is especially important that the law remain stable and clear”).  
 215.  See McEldowney, supra note 98, at 1639. 
 216.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 217.  See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001).  
 218.  See generally Megan A. Yarnall, Comment, Dueling Scientific Experts: Is Australia’s Hot Tub Method a 
Viable Solution for the American Judiciary?, 88 OR. L. REV. 311, 317–21 (2009) (discussing the inherent bias in 
providing testimony in exchange for cash). 
 219.  See infra Part VI.B.1. 
 220.  See infra Part VI.B.2; see also FED. R. EVID. 706; John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for 
Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1431 (2003) (providing that the role of a Rule 706 expert is 
sufficiently neutral because even these special experts may be subjected to the cross-examination process).  
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ten consider appointing judges who specialize in patent law or who have a technical 
background.221 
1. Judges Should Hold an Invalidity Testimony Hearing Prior to Submission to a Jury 
To provide clarity to decision-makers in patent infringement cases, federal district 
court judges need to hold initial hearings strictly for the purpose of determining the 
sufficiency of scientific expert testimony. Such an approach is similar to that taken 
in Sprint Communications Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,222 wherein an expert had an 
opportunity to cure deficiencies on the record by providing a factual basis for pre-
viously made conclusory statements.223 By holding an initial hearing, judges decrease 
the chance of exacerbating juror bias, and by allowing a period to cure deficiencies, 
judges avoid penalizing litigants for their confusion regarding the current state of 
law on the admissibility of expert testimony. 
2. Judges Should Actively Use Rule 706 in Cases with Dueling Experts 
Judges need to take advantage of the Rules’ allowance for court appointed experts. 
Rule 706 states that “the court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and 
any of its own choosing.”224 Given the tendency of each party in patent invalidity 
hearings to provide opposing scientific testimony regarding a single technical term 
at hand, a third party would provide an efficient and less cumbersome method to 
sort through the jargon.225 The Federal Circuit has even expressly stated that a lower 
federal district court has not abused its discretion in hiring a Rule 706 technical ex-
pert to help elucidate a complicated patent.226 In addition, the Advisory Notes for 
Rule 706 explicitly provide “the trend is increasingly to provide for [the] use” of 
court appointed experts and that a judge’s power to make such an appointment is 
“virtually unquestioned.”227 
 221.  See infra Part VI.B.3. 
 222.  Sprint Communications Co. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 05-2433-JWL, 2007 WL 2572417 (D. Kan. 
Sept. 4, 2007). 
 223.  Id. at *2. 
 224.  FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 225.  See Dolly Wu, Patent Litigation: What About Qualification Standards for Court Appointed Experts?, 2010 
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 91501, at 3–7 (2010) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s and the legislative history’s 
support for appointing Rule 706 experts); see also Wiley, supra note 220, at 1413 (stating that although 80% of 
judges have never tried using a court appointed expert, those who have appointed an independent expert found 
the appointment process to be extremely effective in trial management). But see Harvard Law Review, Improving 
Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946 (1997) (expressing 
concern that there is not significant guidance on how to prevent judges from merely handing over their gate-
keeping role to a technical advisor). 
 226.  See Monolithic Power v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir . 2009) (validating a lower 
federal district court’s decision to use a Rule 706 expert testimony on: 1) the nature of technology at hand, 2) 
the obviousness of the claimed invention, and 3) infringement of the patent).  
 227.  FED. R. EVID. 706 (2006) advisory committee’s note. 
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3. Patent Cases Should be Presided Over by Specialty Judges 
Patent cases should be presided over by judges either with backgrounds in a science 
or applied math field or with specialized experience. Part of the reason that the Fed-
eral Circuit is so effective in elucidating complex technical patent litigation is that 
several of its members have that necessary technical background.228 The fact that few 
patent cases actually end up reaching the courtroom should simplify this modest 
goal.229 Districts that are more likely to maintain a heavy patent docket should be 
highlighted as courts to receive judges with more technical experience.230 
The concept of specialized courts and judges for patent law is not a new one. Re-
cently, the U.S. court system began a “Patent Pilot Program.”231 In this program, 
fourteen federal district courts were selected to participate for a ten-year duration.232 
Participation in the program was limited to courts in districts that has had a high 
volume of patent cases or courts that adopted local rules for patent and plant varie-
ty protection cases.233 Within each court, at least one judge is designated to receive 
patent cases, in the event that the initial randomly designated judge declines to hear 
the case.234 
In the short term, the Patent Pilot Program would be an ideal place to imple-
ment specific evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. The 
Program is being implemented in part by the Judicial Conference Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management, and it, or the Federal Judicial Center, 
 228.  See History of the Federal Judiciary, Federal Judicial Center (Nov. 15, 2011 10:00 AM), 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (revealing that of the 11 currently occupied seats on the 
Federal Circuit, 6 Judges, including Judges Rader, Newman, Lourie, Linn, Prost, and Moore, had either a tech-
nical background or extensive experience in a patent related field prior to becoming Federal Circuit Judges). 
However, of the nine Supreme Court Justices, four majored in History, with the remaining Justices holding 
undergraduate degrees in English, Philosophy, Public Policy, Political Science, and Government. Id. 
 229.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases — An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 365, 374 (2000) (finding that only around 100 out of 2000 filed patent cases actually reaching 
trial). 
 230.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS TBL. C11 (2009). These 
patent “rocket dockets” include the Central District of California, the District of Delaware, the District of New 
Jersey, the Eastern District of Texas, and the Northern District of California. Id. 
 231.  The Program began in most selected courts in July 2011. The courts that have been selected to partici-
pate in the patent pilot project courts include the: Eastern District of New York; Southern District of New York; 
Western District of Pennsylvania; District of New Jersey; District of Maryland; Northern District of Illinois; 
Southern District of Florida; District of Nevada; Eastern District of Texas; Northern District of Texas; Western 
District of Tennessee; Central District of California; Northern District of California; and the Southern District 
of California. See Pub. L. No. 111–349; see also USCOURTS, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_ 
Program.aspx. 
 232.  See Pub. L. No. 111–349; see also USCOURTS, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_ 
Program.aspx. 
 233.  See USCOURTS, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx. 
 234.  Id. 
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could be the ideal creator of a set of administrable and straightforward rules.235 At 
the very least, these governing authorities could facilitate a collective conversation 
for best practices regarding the admission of expert testimony. 
C. Evaluation of Proposed Solution Against Stated Goals 
The proposed long-term and short-term solutions would assist the federal judiciary 
in meeting several of the objectives discussed above. My proposed long-term solu-
tion would assist courts in encouraging consistency across federal districts by creat-
ing a heightened evidentiary standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, de-
crease confusion regarding the applicable standard for admitting expert testimony, 
defer to Federal Circuit guidance for the admissibility standard, and resolve the dis-
parate standards currently employed by the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. My 
proposed short-term solution would assist to create special heightened standards in 
patent cases and to eliminate jury or judicial bias. Overall, a combination of both 
long-term and short-term proposals would adequately address all of the problems 
discussed in Section V. 
VII. Conclusion 
After reviewing the current evidentiary standards for technical experts in patent in-
fringement cases, it is evident that the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert 
Standard236 are not immediately reconcilable with the better suited and more logical 
standard evinced by the Federal Circuit in Koito.237 Due to the preferred alignment 
of the heightened evidentiary burden required by the court in Koito with the insti-
tuted legal requirements in proving invalidity of a patent, many federal district 
courts have ignored the Daubert Supreme Court precedent and instead adopted 
rules more similar to Koito.238 
A preferred solution239 was presented that would maintain the integrity of the 
legislative history surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit and continue to 
promote favorable social and economic policy consistent with express support for 
patent reform from both the Legislative and Executive branches. In the long term, 
this solution would require amending or editing the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
create a heightened exception to evidentiary standards consistent with modern pa-
tent law jurisprudence, and it would also require promotion of the Koito Standard 
as the preferred method of dealing with technical expert testimony in patent in-
 235.  See id. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 237.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 238.  See supra Parts V.A–B. 
 239.  See supra Part V. 
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fringement cases.240 On the other hand, and more realistically, the method would in 
the short-term require judges to rule sua sponte of the adequacy of scientific expert 
testimony in a hearing that is not available to the jurors, and therefore decrease the 
risk of juror bias.241 
 240.  See supra Part VI.A. 
 241.  See supra Part VI.B. 
